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Ν. OlKONOMIDES 
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BYZANTINE COUNTRYSIDE 
IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE xth CENTURY 
The Xth century is a period of social transformation in the Byzantine 
empire. According to the prevailing theory, the population oi the provinces, 
mainly made up of small landowners, was then undergoing a change, due to 
the proliferation of big estates of aristocratic families or of ecclesiastical 
institutions: in their insatiable desire to increase their domains and their 
revenues, the 'powerful' Byzantines put pressure upon their neighbours in 
order to acquire their land -preferably land that was already cultivated and 
did not require investments in order to become productive. From their side, 
the small landowners who decided to sell, had little choice but to stay on the 
same piece of land and cultivate it as paroikoi, i.e. as dependent tenant 
peasants. The catastrophic winter of 927/28 abruptly accelerated this 
process1. 
Becoming the paroikos of a big landowner was not necessarily a bad 
arrangement for a peasant, at least in the short run. Lay and ecclesiastic 
landowners protected their men in all manner of adversity, and sometimes 
1. The bibliography concerning the agrarian problem in Byzantium is vast. I would 
quote the classical analysis of the main sources by P. LEMHRLE. The Agrarian History ot 
Byzantium from the Origins to the Twelfth Century, Gal way 1979, and the important 
book by G. LITAVRIN, Vizantijskoe obscestvo igosudarstvo ν X-Xl vi\, Moscow 1977: 
the important recent books ot A. HARVEY, Economic Expansion in the Byzantine 
Empire, 900-1200, Cambridge 1989, and of M. KAPLAN, Les hommes et la terre a 
Byzance du Vie au Xle siècle, Paris 1992; and the even more recent and provocative 
article of A. KAZHDAN, State, Feudal and Private Economy in Byzantium, DOP 47. 
1993, 83-100. 
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offered them reasonably good working conditions thanks to their fiscal 
privileges2. But this transformation of the peasantry had important 
consequences for the State finances: it meant that the independent taxpayers, 
who used to pay up all their taxes in the past, were now sheltered by the big 
landowners' privileges, and did not pay them any more. The decrease of the 
fiscal revenue was felt in Constantinople and the Xth century emperors 
issued a series of novellae, the purpose of which was to stop the wealthy 
from acquiring land belonging to the free small peasantry. The fact that 
many laws have subsequently been issued on the same subject, shows that 
the legislation did not attain its goal right away. And we do not know to 
which point the small free property system was corroded and the State 
revenues had fallen at the beginnings of this legislative effort against the big 
landowners3. The present paper is concerned with this last question. 
In the technical vocabulary of the times, landowners were defined either 
as 'powerful' (dynatoi) or as 'poor' {penetes). But the line drawn between 
them was not always clear, as both terms have a qualitative connotation 
originating from different principles. The best definition that I know, is that 
dynatos is the person who, thanks to his social position and/or his clout 
and/or his relations, can intimidate the others4. 
Another distinction between these two social groups was inspired by 
fiscal criteria and might appear as clearer. It was based on the fiscal concept 
of chorion (village), an agglomeration of small landowners, with some com­
munal property and common responsibility for acquitting the village's fiscal 
obligations. This last aspect of fiscal solidarity was fundamental, in spite of 
the fact that the taxes of villagers were calculated individually according to 
what each of them possessed, and that there was little communal activity, 
2. This I tried to show in Ή Πείρα περί πάροικων, 'Αφιέρωμα στον Νίκο 
Σβορώνο I, Rethymno 1986, 232-241. 
3. We now have a new edition of these novellae: N. SVORONOS, Les novellcs des 
empereurs macédoniens concernant la terre et les stratiotes, éd. posthume par P. 
GOI:NARIDIS, Athens 1994; as it often happens with posthumus publications, it presents 
several shortcomings: see L. BURGMANN, Editio per testamentum, Rechtshistorisches 
Journal 13, 1994,455-479. 
4. SVORONOS, Les novelles, 70, 71 (n° 2). 
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except when facing the tax collector5" The chorion was thus a fiscal unit ot 
substantial dimensions, no doubt composed essentially b> ptnetes -a unit 
composed of many individuals, all good taxpayers, with whom the fiscus 
would deal collectively 
By rejuvenating and better defining the trautional preemption rights 
the Xth century emperors tried to impede the powerful iiom acquiring 
property inside the village communities One term used to qualifv these 
wealthy landowners, was that ot "powerful persons' pwsopd'\ le indivi­
duals whose domains were large enough to be considered as separate fiscal 
units It is obvious that any fiscal 'prosopon' had to be a dynaios, ι e a land 
owning individual or institution, such as a monaster} 
It is important to note that in all thi, effort to ensure the legulai 
collection of taxes, the Xtf century governmtnts
 5eern not to have senousK 
envisaged -and, even less, tried- to dimmish or cancel the liscal pnvilegts 
and other advantages ot the dyndtoi, as it the> weie an inevitable tact of hie 
They have only tried to protect the 'good taxpayers' by keeping them inside 
their villages and away from the powerful s domains and protection The Xth 
century legislation was motivated by nanowlv fiscal -and not social-
considerations 
In this context, one has to estimate that the fiscal obligations of the 
powerful should have been more lenient than ihose ot the poor, not in 
absolute figures, but as a proportion ot the total revenue Let me explain 
what I mean 
Powerful and poor had to pay the basic land tax, the demosion, which 
was calculated tor all according to the same rates and was directlv 
proportionate to the value ot the taxed property7 No-one could escape from 
this obligation, except it ht could obtain a special privilege, called logisimon. 
and liberating him from the payment ot the ba>ic land tax But until the 
second half of the Xlth century, this privilege was granted rather sparingly 
5 The limited extent ot communal activities in the B\/amine villages is nghtlv 
stressed by KAPLAN, Hommes et terre 211 it 
6 Eg SVORONOS, Les novelles,n°2,1 77,86 87 
7 The basic land tax normally amounted to I/24th ot the liscal value of the taxed 
property and was increased bv the addition ot some surtaxe > called paiakolouthtm ita 
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and mostly to ecclesiastical institutions. Thus one may assume that as far as 
the demosion is concerned, powerful and poor were taxed proportionately to 
their properties. 
But there were also the side taxes, obligations and corvées, which were 
neither equally distributed nor exacted from all. The powerful were, by 
definition, not submitted to the degrading ones. On the other hand, they were 
struck by some extraordinary taxes (such as the monoprosopon that we shall 
see below) which were expensive per se, but relatively light in relation to 
their properties. In other words, the powerful were undertaxed as far as 
their secondary obligations were concerned. 
Also they could obtain an exkousseia, i.e. an exemption from some or 
all secondary taxes. This privilege was granted more easily than the logisi-
mon. But in the texts that we are going to discuss below, tax exemption is 
irrelevant as we will be discussing powerful landowners who did not escape 
from their secondary taxes but paid them in full. 
We shall focus on some texts describing an extraordinary contribution 
imposed on the Peloponnesian army and the Feloponnesian dynatoi in the 
Xth century and try to establish the relative importance of each of these 
groups and of the peasants that depended from them. The ultimate purpose 
will be to evaluate the relative importance of the dependent peasantry in the 
Peloponnesos and to compare this conclusion with what we know from the 
Thrakesion in Asia Minor at approximately the same time. 
The Testimony ot Constantine Porphyrogennetos 
Our basic information comes from a well-known text of Constantine 
Porphyrogennetos 8 . The events described are dated under the reign of 
8, CONSTANTINE PORPHYROUENITI S, De Administrando Imperio, ed. Gy. 
MORAVCSIK - R. J. Η. JENKINS, eh. 51,1. 199-204 and eh. 52. The texts that I am going to 
use infra have been discussed recently by W. TREADGOLD, The Army in the Works of 
Constantine Porphyrogenitus, Ri\ista di Studi Bizantini e Neoellenici 29, 1992, 77-162, 
esp. 99-100 and 125-127. Treadgold's approach and conclusions are completely different 
from mine, so much .so that I do not need discussing the many points of disagreement, 
except whenever my argument is directly concerned. 
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Romanos I Lakapenos (920-944), at the time when the protospatharios John 
Proteuon was strategos in the Peloponnesos: this officer is known from other 
texts of the same treatise concerning a revolt of the Melingoi and Ezeritai 
Slavs, events that have been variously dated: early 921 was proposed by 
Jenkins and others before him9, 934 by S. Runciman, and 935 by G. Litavrin 
who partly followed B. Feriancic10. All are uncertain; the latter seems to me 
more likely, but does not carry conviction. In any case, this detail has no 
importance for our argument. 
We learn that emperor Romanos Lakapenos intended to have the 
Peloponnesians participate to a [one-season] campaign in Byzantine Italy, in 
the theme of Longobardia. The Peloponnesians opted against the campaign, 
and proposed to give [instead] a thousand equipped horses and one hundred 
pounds in gold coins (i.e. 7.200 nomismata), and tris they supplied with great 
readiness. 
To collect the above, contributions at fixed rates were exacted from 
almost all the prosopa of the Peloponnesos (with some, I believe insigni-
ficant, exceptions, see infra) and from all the 'soldiers' of the Peloponnesian 
army. The prosopa provided the horses. The two metropolitans of Corinth 
and of Patras gave four horses each, the bishops and the monasteries two 
horses each, and the monasteries without means, one horse between two. 
The contributions of the lay dynatoi were fixed according to the precedence 
of titles that each held and which were obviously thought to correspond to a 
certain economic situation: the protospatharioi gave three horses each; the 
spatharokandidatoi, two horses each; and the spatharioi and stratores, one 
horse each. 
Cash was collected from the whole 'army' of the Peloponnesos. Each 
'soldier' contributed five nomismata in respect to this campaign; from those 
absolutely without means (pantelos aporoi), five nomismata from every two 
were exacted. This made up the total of 7.200 gold coins. 
9. CONSTANTINE PoRPHYROGENSTUS, De Administrando Imperio II, Commentary, 
London 1962, 204. 
10. KONSTANTIN BAGRJANARODNYJ, Ob upravlenii imperiej, Moscow 1989, 436-
437. 
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The Peloponnesian Soldiers and their contributions 
Although presented here as an extraordinary arrangement, the soldiers' 
cash contribution is in fact a well-known procedure. We know of a similar 
example from the accounts of the campaign against Crete in the year 949: we 
are told that eight hundred soldiers of the theme of the Thrakesion (Western 
Asia Minor) contributed four gold coins each for not participating to the 
campaign; 41 pounds and 32 nomismata (or 2.984 nomismata) were thus 
collected, part ot which (24 pounds and 56 nomismata) was used to pay the 
salaries of 705 Armenian officers and soldiers of the theme of Charpezikion, 
who actually went to Crete". We can assume that a similar arrangement 
was also made in the case of the Peloponnesos: the soldiers paid cash to 
avoid the hardships of the campaign, and with the money that was thus 
collected, other, less discriminating and, probably, less expensive soldiers 
were hired for the actual campaign. 
There is one more detail worth pointing to. The total amount of 2.984 
nomismata of the Thrakesion could be collected from 800 men only if part of 
them, 108, were also classified as 'completely without means' and paid half 
as much as the others12. This would mean that 13.5% of the soldiers of the 
Thrakesion were 'without means'. 
In both cases we have the application, on a large scale, of the basic 
procedure of the strateia. The soldier farmer, holding land permanently 
registered as military, had the obligation to maintain a horse and an armour 
and to make himself available to the army whenever needed; in the IXth 
century, the soldier-farmer was called for actual service once every four 
11. CONSTANTINE PORPHYROGENNETOS, De cerimoniis aulae byzantinae (Bonn), 
666-667.1 see no reason to imagine, against all evidence, that the Charpezikion soldiers 
were members of the Banu Habib tribe, as hypothesized by TREADGOLD, The Army, 128 
ff. 
12. I have pointed to this discrepancy and gave the explanation in: N. 
OIKONOMIDES, Actes de Dionysiou, Paris 1968, 39. The discrepancy is ignored by 
TREADGOLD, The Army, 127, who keeps imagining a Thrakesion of ca 10.000 soldiers. 
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years13. When on campaign, he also received a salary. As a compensation 
for the acquisition and maintenance ot his military equipment, he and his 
land were exempted from all secondary contributions and corvées, that 
burdened the non-soldiers. The military obligation, attached to the land, not 
to the person, was hereditary14. 
Now, whenever it was impossible tor the holder of a military lot to 
accomplish personally the military service (as in the case of the widow ol the 
soldier), a compensatory payment of about 4-6 gold coins (or 2-3 coins in case 
of soldiers without means) was required1''. Thus, in both cases, of the 
Peloponnesos and ot the Thrakesion, we have the principle of the compen-
satory payment applied at a large scale, motivated not from an objective 
need, but from the preference of the stratioiai and the acceptance of their 
proposal by the authorities16. 
It is reasonable to assume that if the military service was conceived in 
such a fiscal mentality, there must have been an evaluation of what a 'fair' 
13. I have discussed the pertinent texts in: Middle-Byzantine Provincial Recruits: 
Salary and Armament, Gonimos. Neoplatonic and Bvzannne Studies presented to L. G. 
Westerink at 75, Buffalo, N. Y. 1988, 121-136; a geneial study of the question with 
bibliographical indications but holding to the author's previous points of view, in: J. 
HALDON, Military Service, Military Lands and the Status of Soldiers. Current Problems and 
Interpretations, DOP 47, 1993, 1-67; on the contrary, new points ot view that will 
certainly generate discussions, are proposed by KAPLAN, Hommes et terre, 231-255. 
14. The relationship between possession of land and military service has been put to 
doubt by Martha GRLGORIOL-IOANMDOL, Les biens militaires et le recrutement a 
Byzance. Essai de determiner et interpreter le rapport entre les biens militaires et le 
recrutement, Βνζαντιακα 12, 1992, 215-226. 
15. Actes de Dionysiou, 39. 
16. In earlier times, under Leo VI (886-912), compensatory payment for not 
participating to a campaign was accepted selectively, from individual soldiers who chose to 
do so, while the rest of their theme actually went with the army: De Administrando Imperio, 
eh. 51,1. 192-198. In the case ot the Peloponnesos (sometime between 920 and 944), this 
was a collective decision ot the whole theme. In that of the Thrakesion (949), one has the 
impression that payment from the soldiers of the Thrakesion was exacted from the 
authorities -at least, nothing in the text shows that the soldiers had any opportunity to 
express their will on this subject. It is interesting to follow how the adaeratio of the military 
service was imposing itself from the selective free choice, to the collective free choice and 
then to the obligation imposed from above. But the examples that we have are very few 
and not always clear; thus I would prefer to avoid any general conclusion. 
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or 'typical' military holding would be -what holding would combine in a 
optimum way the right revenue for its soldier-owner and the best protection 
of the interests of the fiscus. To put it differently: on one hand, the state was 
losing revenue because of the partial tax exemption granted to stratiotic 
lands and had all interest to diminish these losses to the degree possible; on 
the other hand, the state acknowledged that the stratiotes needed sufficient 
revenue, in order to survive and be properly equipped. As the income 
derived from the tax exemption was in principle proportionate to the value 
(and, consequently, to the revenue) of the properties held by the stratiotes, 
the question would be to define what quantity of property would be sufficient 
to create a well-off soldier without abandoning to him more fiscal revenue 
than what was really necessary. 
The question has been asked in similar terms by the Byzantines; efforts 
have been made to define what a 'normal' stratiotic holding, a stratiotikos 
oikos, should be. In a novella dating from 947 (?) Constantine Porphyrogen-
netos established officially that the strateia of a horseman, i.e. of a typical 
thematic soldier, should preferably be worth 4 pounds of gold (or 288 
nomismata) in real estate: this would have been the 'right quantity' (dikaia 
posotes)17. Another text of the Porphyrogennetos, not official in character, 
considers that the properties worth four pounds were a minimum for the 
horseman and that the right figure would rather be five pounds (360 
nomismata)18. But it seems that the official figure always remained at 4 
pounds, as this is still the figure quoted by Nikephoros Phokas (963-969)19. 
We shall use the 'legally confirmed' figure of four pounds for out 
calculations that follow. 
It must be stressed right away, though, that ihii value of 288 gold coin? 
for the property of a soldier-farmer was not mandatory and that individua 
properties may have varied considerably. But as these variations could gc 
both ways, I consider the figure 288 as an average. 
17. SVORONOS, Les novelles, 118, 119. 
18. De Cerimoniis (Bonn), 695. 
19. SVORONOS, Les novelles, 176. Nikephoros Phokas brought that figure up to 12 
pounds to finance his heavily armoured cavalry. 
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Now, the real estate of such a value could consist of all kinds of land, of 
sharply varying productivity arable, vineyards, gardens, etc But we assume 
that land submitted to intensive cultivation and, consequently, more produ-
ctive, had a higher fiscal value By fiscal value I mean the one that was used 
to evaluate the properties in view of imposing them According to a fiscal 
handbook ot the Xth c, one should count one nomisma tor one modios ot 
land of first quality20 Starting from that ligure, we can build some 
hypotheses on the assumption that we have imaginary properties consisting 
uniquely of first quality land In this case, a soldier would have possessed, as 
an average, 288 modioi But one must stress that this is a very hypothetical 
example and that in reality the production of a military lot was much more 
varied. Although cenami y inexact, we keep the above scheme foi the sake of 
clarity in the calculations 
Two hundred eighty eight modioi is a considerable quantity of arable 
We know that the estimations of the surface that could be cultivated in 
Byzantine times by one pair of oxen during one year varied considerably, 
between 83 and 213 modioi It has been proposed that as an average, one 
should count around 140 modioi per 7euganon2] Thus the land of a stratiotes 
corresponded roughly to two zeugarm, and needed two manned pairs ot oxen 
in order to be cultivated properly In other words, a stratiotes was normally 
sustained by the work ol two well-off farmer families, his own and another 
one that worked on his land, probably ot a relative, but may be of a salaried 
worker or even of a paroikos22. But this was certainly not applied with 
uniformity, on the contrary we know of some examples of soldiers who seem 
20 J LFFORT and al, Geometries du fisc byzantin, Pans 1991, 62 (for the date, see 
34-35) 
21 E SCHILBACH, Byzantinische Metrologie, Munich 1970, 68-70 
22 Leo VI insists that a stratiotikos oikos must be an affluent unit, able to ensure the 
agricultural production while the soldier will be away on campaign, see LEMERLF, Agrariern 
History, 141 Two eighth century texts envisage clearly that a military household is 
composed of properties held by two brothers, only one of whom is the soldier ct mv 
analysis m Middle-Byzantine Provincial Recruits, 130 ft 
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to have been fending for themselves and their own family without the support 
of a larger oikos22. 
In what follows, we shall base our calculations on fiscal rather than on 
demographic criteria. Our basic unit will be the nuclear family possessing a 
pair of oxen and cultivating the corresponding land -the peasant zeugaratos. 
Now we know that from the economic and fiscal point ot view, one 
zeugaratos was the equivalent of two families ot bo'ïdatoi (who possessed 
only one ox) or of four tamilies ot aktemones (with no oxen)24. So, theoreti-
cally, two boidatoi could have replaced one zeugaratos with no major 
difference from the fiscal point of view, but with a major difference from the 
demographic point of view, as there would be two families instead of one. 
This is a weakness of our calculations that one should constantly keep in 
mind, whenever we mention, infra, peasants as 'zeugaratoi or the 
equivalent'. Because we are talking fiscal units, not demographic ones. 
The passage of the De Admimstrando Imperio that we are studying has 
been used to estimate the total number of soldiers ot the Peloponnesos, who 
provided the 7.200 gold coins. The reasoning goes as follows: it they were all 
affluent and paid 5 nomismata each, they would number 1.440 men, if they 
were all poor, they would number 2880; and the figure of ca 2.000 soldiers 
has been proposed as something close to reality. I think that this last figure 
should be rejected right away, as it would mean that the Peloponnesos had 
only 880 well-off soldiers as opposed to 1.120 indigent2^. The figure that 
seems to me more likely, would be an army of 1 500-1.600 men, out of 
whom 120-320, i.e. a 8-20%, would have been indigent. This would show a 
23 This would have been, for example, the case ot the soldier Mousouhos, from the 
Life ot St. Philaretos: when left without a horse at the time of the campaign, he turns to a 
neighbour for help; obviously he Ed not expect much help from his own household See M.-
Η. FOLRMY and M. LEROY, La Vie de saint Philarete, Byzantion 9, 1934, 125-127. 
24 SCHILBACH, Metrologie, 256 
25 The figure of 2.000 (1 120 poor and 880 not very poor) is accepted by 
TREADGOLD, The Army, 99, because of the quasi magic importance that he attributes to 
the (completely unfounded) hypothesis that: every theme or tagma had an even number ot 
thousand men. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 04:26:29 |
COUNTRYSIDE IN THE Xth CENTURY 115 
situation similar to the one prevailing in the Thrakesion, where the 
percentage of indigent soldiers would have been 13.5%26. 
There is another way to handle these figures. If a full-revenue soldier 
had an average property of 288 nomismata, one can postulate that a poor 
one, contributing half that amount, would have, as an average, half the above 
property and be supported by one zeugarion. It is hard to imagine a cavalry 
soldier poorer than that, as we know that those who became completely 
destitute, were removed from the regular cavalry and became irregulars 
('rustlers', ape/ara;) or were assigned to garrisons as footsoldiers27. More-
over, we know what was considered the threshold to legal 'poverty', aporia: 
an immovable property worth less than 50 gold coins28. The soldiers without 
means of the De Administnindo text should be placed, in my opinion, well 
above this level of legal poverty, supported by only one family, possibly -but 
not necessarily- possessing a zeugarion. 
This being so, I would tend to estimate that for every contribution of 5 
gold coins, one should count two zeugaratoi families and consequently that 
the Peloponnesian army was supported by ca 2.880 'zeugaratoi or the 
equivalent'. 
The Peloponnesian aristocrats and their contributions 
We turn now to the collection of horses. It is presented in the text as 
something resulting from a special arrangement made for the occasion; yet 
we know that it was the application of a routine fiscal practice, called the 
monoprosopon, i.e. a contribution exacted only from wealthy taxpayers-
fiscal prosopa. Again in the accounts of the expedition against Crete of 911, 
we find an entry specifying that, to provide the army with the necessary 
26. Supra, p. 108 and infra, p. 122. 
27. LEMERLE, Agrarian History, 135. The term apelates has been recently 
commented upon by Lisa BÊNOU, Les apélates: Des rebelles ou des malfaiteurs? in: Marie 
Theres FÜGEN (ed.), Ordnung und Aufruhr im Mittelalter, Jus Commune, Sonderheft 70, 
Frankfurt 1995, 287-299. 
28. SVORONOS, Les novelles, 100. This is a traditional definition of poverty, aporia: 
see LEMERLE, Agrarian History, 99, note 1. 
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horses, the government envisaged resorting to the collection of monoprosopi 
in the theme of the Anatohkoi (απο εκθέσεως μονοπρόσωπων εν τώ Οεματ 
των Ανατολικών)20. Also, contributions in horses and mules were regularl; 
exacted, as sportulae, from high state officials, metropolitans, archbishop 
and monasteries on the occasion of imperial campaigns, but the rates wen 
different from those mentioned in our text10 
We have in this passage the list ot the wealthy landowners of th 
Peloponnesos -of all the prosopa that were liable to participate to thi 
contribution One has the impression that this list must be exhaustive, as th 
piosopa that have not contributed are dutifully reported Thus one mus 
conclude that holders of higher titles, such as patnkios or magistros, did nr 
exist then in the Peloponnesos: in any case, the top officers or admimstratoi 
of the theme that are attested until the middle of the Xth c have no high« 
title than the one of protospathartosii 
In order to describe the lay aristocrats, our text enumerates the holde 
of titles called 'imperial' or 'of the retinue' (προελευσιμαιοι), of militai 
origin and having originally meant personal servants of the emperor: proti 
spathanoi, spatharokandidatoi, spathariot and stratore^2. In this list are n< 
included any holders of 'senatorial' titles (such as dishypatos, hypato 
vestitor, silentianos, apo eparchon), no doubt because such dignitaries d 
29 De Cenmonus (Bonn), 658 For a general presentation of the obligation, s< 
Helene Gl YGATZI-AHRW FILER, Recherches sur l'administration de l'empire byzantin ai 
IXe-XIe siècles, BCHM, 1960,5, note 7 
30 De Cenmonus (Bonn), 459-461 = J HALDON, Constantine Porph\iogtmti 
Three Treatises on Imperial Military Expeditions, Vienna 1990, 98f 
31 There is a sharp difference, on this point, with the situation on the easte 
frontier, where we find, at approximately the same time, an Armenian chieftain, Meli. 
bearing the titles ot patnkios- (ca 916) and, later, ot magistros (De Admmistrando Imper 
ch 50,1 162, 166) But the Peloponnesos, in spite of the threat ot the Slavs, was rath 
well protected while the east lived in a context of constant war, the high titles came 
Melias as a compensation tor military exploits against the Arabs 
32 The protospathanoi, spatharokandidatoi, spathanoi appear to be membeis of t 
provincial autonties in a document issued in 892 by Symbaticius, strategos of Macedon 
Thrace, Cephaloma and Longobardia. TRINCHFRA, Syllabus graecarum membranaru 
Naples 1865, n° 3 
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not exist in the Peloponnesos33. Among the holdtrs of imperial titles (i.e. 
protospatharioi, etc.) three categories, the ploimoi. the konchyleutai and the 
chartopoioi, were exempted from the obligation to provide horses. The 
reasons of this exception are not difficult to guess. 
(a) Ploimoi are men serving in the navy. We know that the 
Peloponnesos maintained in the Xth c. a ftottilla of at least four warships 
(chelandia) that policed the sea34. It is obvious thai: the officers of the navy 
were not concerned by the campaign of the army in Italy and thus were not 
touched by the levy of horses. 
(b) Konchyleutai are the purple-fishers. Such an occupation is normal for 
the shores of the Peloponnesos, known to produce purple since Antiquity. As 
the main, if not the only, consumer of purple was the palace and the imperial 
workshops, we can assume that the title holders, in whose properties purple 
fishing (or purple farming) was performed, had benefitted of a special 
exemption in their quality of furnishers of the court. 
(c) Chartopoioi are in my opinion paper makers (or in the opinion of 
Jenkins, parchment makers). As an important consumer of paper was 
undoubtedly the imperial palace (the earliest known imperial documents are 
all written on paper), the chartopoioi could also be considered as furnishers 
of the court and benefit from the same exemption as the purple fishers35. 
Be that as it may, it seems certain that the title holders exempted from 
the levy of horses must not have been too many -taking into consideration 
their occupations, I would say, not more than a dozen. 
Let us now turn to the census of the Peloponnesian aristocrats who 
actually gave horses. 
1. We have two metropolitans, of Corinth and of Patras, who gave four 
horses each. This is the largest contribution attested, showing how economi-
cally important the metropolitans were. The bishops gave only two horses 
33. N. OIKONOMIDÈS, Les listes de préséance byzantines des IXe et Xe siècles, Paris 
1972, 99 and note 57. 
34. N. OIKONOMIDÈS, Ό Βίος του άγιου Θεοδώρου Κυθήρων (10ος αι.), Τρίτον 
Παηόνιον Συνέδριον. Πρακτικά, Athens 1967, 277. 
35.1 have exposed how I understand these chartopoioi in: Le support matériel des 
documents byzantins, La Paléographie grecque et byzantine, Colloques internationaux du 
CNRS 559, Paris 1977, 395 ff. 
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each; they were probably eleven in the Peloponnesos at the time of the 
levy 3 6 , so they have provided 22 horses. The hierarchy of the clergy 
provided a total ot 30 horses. 
2. Then come the protospatharioi, with three horses each. We do not 
know how many protospatharioi lived in Xth century Peloponnesos. But they 
must not have been very many. From another text ot the De Administrandc 
Imperio, which happens to date few years after the mandate of John 
Proteuon in the Peloponnesos, we can see that the protospatharioi were the 
cream of the local authorities3 7 and collaborated directly with the strategos 
of the theme, who was also a protospatharios: when appointed strategos of 
the Peloponnesos, the protospatharios Bardas Platypodes, together with 
some local protospatharioi and other title holders, who were his partisans 
provoked'fierce quarrels and disputes and managed to expel from the 
Peloponnesos the protospatharios Leon Agelastos -quarrels that considerably 
weakened the defenses of the theme 3 8 . It is obvious that this was a case ο 
political infight at the top of the Peloponnesian society: some protospathario 
gained the strategos on their side and sent to exile their opponent, anothe' 
protospatharios, Leo Agelastos, who obviously had also his own partisans 
Even if we assume that there may have also been some protospatharioi whc 
remained neutral, their total number must have been very small -ten tc 
twenty, in all and for all, probably less, certainly not more. Thus th< 
protospatharioi, at the rate of 3 horses each, must have provided another 30 
60 horses. 
36. To estimate the number of bishops, I have used J. DARROI ZES, Notitiat 
episcopatuum Ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae, Paris 1981. Notitia n° 7 (dated betweer 
901-907) mentions five peloponnesian bishoprics tor Corinth (Damalas, Argos 
Monembasia, Zemaina, Maine), and six for Patras (Lakedaimonia, Methone, Korone 
Bolaina, Moreas, Helos). Notitia n° 9 of the forties or fifties ot the Xth century, add: 
Kythera to Corinth and omits Moreas from Patras. Both mention a total of 1 
peloponnesian bishoprics for the two metropolis.- We do not count here the islam 
bishoprics of Zakynthos and Kephalonia, suffragan to Corinth, but belonging to the them« 
of Kephalonia. 
37. The very high social status of the protospatharioi in the Peloponnesos is al sc 
indirectly attested by Arethas: ARETHAF, Scripta minora, I, ed. L. G. WESTERINK, Leipzii 
1968, 230. 
38. De Administrando Imperio, eh. 50,1. 54-66. 
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3. I assume also that the contribution of the utterly poor monasteries 
must not have been very substantial. I would guess, with no conviction, that 
they would not be accountable for more than 30 horses, which would mean 
that there were less than 60 utterly poor monasteries in the Peloponnesos. 
The above figures, except for the one of the bishops, are arbitrary but 
cannot, I think, be very far from reality. The rest of the horses must have 
been provided by well-off monasteries or by spatharokandidatoi (2 horses 
each), or by spatharioi and stratores (1 horse each). We do not know how to 
break down that figure. If we say that the spatharokandidatoi were more 
than double the protospatharioi, and that the spatharioi and stratores were, 
each, more than double the spatharokandidatoi, we would have 20-40 spatha­
rokandidatoi accounting for 40-80 horses, and 80-160 spatharioi and stratores 
accounting for an equal number of horses. In toto, the lay magnates and 
notables of the Peloponnesos would have provided 150-300 horses; if one 
adds the 30 horses of the bishops and another 30 of the poor monasteries, 
one arrives to the estimate that the Peloponnesos of the Xth c. must have 
had no less than 320 well-off monasteries. And 1 his is a very high figure39. 
No matter. All this is arbitrary and each of the above figures is subject 
to change at a whim. But the total number is not, and this imposes a general 
and incontrovertible conclusion: in Xth century Peloponnesos, the lay or 
ecclesiastic aristocratic prosopa numbered anywhere between 500 and 1.000, 
according to my arbitrary calculations, they were ca 600. This figure, 
compared to the 1.500 of the whole thematic army, shows a relationship of 1 
lay or ecclesiastic aristocrat to 2,5 stratiotai. This seems quite dispro­
portionate, yet it is certainly close to reality. 
What is even more important, is to estimiate what the contributors of 
horses represented as economic power. We have seen that in our text there 
is a tendency to distribute the fiscal burden according to the contributor's 
wealth and, probably, possibilities. Now, we know that each horse had a 
considerable value in the Xth century. In the Peri basilikon taxeidion, it is 
specified that a horse ( ίππάριον) levied for the army was worth 12 
39. A first survey of monasticism in the mediaeval Peloponnesos is to be found in 
Anna LAMPROPOULOU, Ό ασκητισμός στην Πελοπό\νησο κατά τήν μέση βυζαντινή 
περίοοο, Athens 1994. 
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nomismata40. Consequently, we can fairly say that the contribution of a horse 
was ca 2'/> times heavier than the five nomismata given by a well-off 
stratiotes, 5 times heavier than the contribution of a poor stratiotes. 
Now, we have estimated supra that in order to keep his status, a poor 
stratiotes must have been himself a 'zeugaratos or the equivalent,' that he 
worked with his family, and that the well-off stratiotes must have had double 
that. If we assumed that the fiscal burden was distributed with absolute 
equity and proportionately to the properties of the taxpayer, we should 
imagine that the Peloponnesian prosopa, lay and ecclesiastic, who provided 
1.000 horses had an economic basis equivalent to at least 5.000 'zeugaratoi 
or the equivalent', certainly much more, since, as they were aristocrats, they 
had to rely on tenant workforce, i.e. on paroikoi, and did not work their land 
themselves. 
I think that we can fairly go much further, if we keep in mind that the 
'powerful' were undertaxed in comparison with the average taxpayer. This is 
openly said in the legislation of the Xth century41. But beyond this 
statement, we have some more precise information. 
We shall not insist on the major athonite monasteries that we know 
from their archives, such as Lavra and Iviron. Already in the second half of 
the Xth c. they were mighty economic organizations and they became even 
more mighty in the Xlth c. But even the occasional information that we have 
about Xth c. monasteries is quite impressive. The monastery of St. Andrew 
of Peristerai, that will later be absorbed by Lavra, possessed many domains 
and received in a single donation 100 paroikoi42. Things are even more 
impressive when looking at the institutions that were absorbed by the 
monastery of Iviron before 979/80: (a) The monastery of Abbakoum in 
Kassandra possessed 8.500 modioi of land plus several non measured 
domains, (b) The monastery of Leontia in Thessalonica, the domains of which 
were exempted from all extraordinary taxation and corvee, received the 
40. De Cerimoniis (Bonn), 459 = HALDON, Three Treatises, 98. 
4L E.g. cf. SVORONOS, Les novelles, 85 (n° 3,1. 69 ff): The many small taxpayers 
guarantee the payment of the fiscal revenue and provide the necessary soldiers; all this is due 
to disappear, if the properties pass to the hands of the 'powerful'. 
42. Actes de Lavra l, ed. P. LEMERLE, A. GUILLOU, N. SVORONOS, Denise 
PAPACHRYSSANTHOU, Paris 1970, 58. 
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right to collect the taxes of 36 peasant households and possessed several non 
measured domains, (c) The monastery of Polygyros, founded and endowed by 
the protospatharios Demetrios Pteleotes, was also exempted from all 
extraordinary taxation and corvee, had received a gift of 20 paroikoi, and 
possessed three domains measuring 50.000, 700, and 4.500 modioi 
respectively, (d) The monastery of Kolovou possessed more than 5.500 
modioi of land in Hierissos and another 9.000 modioi in the Strymon region. 
There is no reason to bring more examples. It is clear that Xth c. well-
off monasteries were wealthy institutions, wonh many times the properties 
that were considered as normal tor one strateia. 
What about lay aristocrats? For the protospatharioi, we already have an 
idea with the properties that Demetrios Pteleotes gave to the monastery that 
he founded (supra, c). We also know some details about the estates of the 
protospatharios Eustathios Boilas, who wrote his will somewhere at the 
eastern frontier of the empire in 1059. He was quite wealthy: he possessed a 
considerable number of domains, the total value of which is unknown. We 
know the value of only one part of his real estate, the part that he gave as 
dowry to his two daughters and as an endowment to his church of the Virgin 
tou Salem: this part was worth 70 pounds of gold (5.040 gold coins). Here 
again this partial figure is a far cry from the 288 coins of the property of 
soldiers (17.5 times more). Now, to this one should add the value of his other 
domains and of his numerous slaves43. It is clear tnat the protospatharios 
Boilas, who lived at a time when the prestige of his title had diminished 
considerably compared to what it was in the [Xth and Xth c , was worth 
manyfold what regular cavalry soldiers were. It is only natural that such 
important landowners needed to employ kouratores to ensure the proper 
administration of their properties44. Also, such extensive proprerties ensured 
for them a very substantial income, certainly much higher than the yearly 
roga that they received from the emperor (72 nomismata for a 
protospatharios). We do not know how Boilas' wealth was created, but we 
43. P. LEMERLE, Cinq études sur le Xle siècle byzantin. Paris 1977, 15-63. 
44. V. LAURENT, La Vie merveilleuse de Saint Pierre d'Atroa, Brussels 1956, 177. 
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know for sure that in 1059 it was invested on landed property almost 
exclusively45. 
Moreover, the activity of IXth-XIth c. dynatoi as patrons of art in the 
provinces, shows that a real gap separated them from the well-off soldiers. 
Protospatharioi were the founders of such churches as Skripou in Boeotia 
(874)4 6 , the church of Vesaina in Thessaly (Xth c.)47, the Panagia ton 
Chalkeon of Thessalonica (1028)48, the Karaba§ Kilise in Cappadocia 
(1060) 4 0 , all major foundations, requiring large outlays of cash. A 
spatharokandidatos was the founder of Hagioi Theodoroi at Athens (1049)50, 
and the church of St. Gregory in Thebes was the work of a kandidatos 
(872)51, a dignitary of lower rank than those mentioned in the text concerning 
the levy of horses. A droungarios, thematic officer without any honorific title 
was the founder of St. John Mangoutis in Athens (871)52. 
It is obvious that all these title holders fared at an economic level mucf 
higher than what would suggest their contribution to the levy of horses. Tht 
protospatharioi, providing 3 horses each, incurred the equivalent of a tota 
expenditure of 36 nomismata, the spatharokandidatoi the equivalent of 2-
45. 1 have tried to show elsewhere that investment in real estate was the best 
opportunity offered to the Byzantine aristocrats, who were excluded by law from al 
commercial transactions. See N. OIKONOMIDÈS, Ή έπένουοη ot ακίνητα γήρω ατό hoc 
1000, Τα Ιστορικά!, 1987, 15-26. 
46. Ν. OIKONOMIDÈS, Pour une nouvelle lecture des inscriptions de Skripou er 
Béotie, TM 12, 1994,479-493. 
47. Anna AVRAMEA, Inventaires en vue d'un recueil des inscriptions historiques de 
Byzance IV. Inscriptions de Thessalie, TM 10, 1987, 368-369. 
48. J.-M. SPIESER, Inventaires en vue d'un recueil des inscriptions historiques d< 
Byzance 1. Les inscriptions de Thessalonique, TM 5, 1973, 163, 164. 
49. G. de JÉRPIIANION, Les églises rupestres de Cappadoce II, Paris 1942, 334. 
50. V. LAURENT, Nicolas Kalomalos et l'église des Saints Théodore à Athènes 
Ελληνικά 7, 1934, 72-82. 
51. G. A. SOIIRIOU, Ό εν Θήβαις βυζαντινός ναός Γρηγορίου τοϋ Θρολόνοι 
Αρχαιολογική Έφημερίς 1924. 1-26. 
52. Α. XYNGOPOULOS, Εύρετήριον των μεσαιωνικών μνημείων 1. Αθηνών, fase 
2, Athens 1929, fig. 88. A certain Nicholas Droungarios (or droungarios?) founded a ehurc 
in Kerkyra in 1074/5; because of the date, the editor of the inscription considers the wor 
droungarios to be a family name; this is probable, but not sure; Cf. P. VOCOTOPOULOS, ii 
CA 21, 1971, 152-153. 
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nomismata, the spathanoi and stratores 12 nomismata. An expenditure 
similar in value would have been undertaken by soldiers supported by 15 or 
10 or 5 -zeugaratoi or the equivalent' farmer units. But this is of course 
unrealistically low, especially if one thinks that these gentlemen provided 
real horses and consequently were expected to have quite large stables in 
order to be able to give away 1-3 animals. 
We turn again to guesswork. Taking into consideration all the above 
parallels, I think that a very conservative estimate would be that the 
properties of the lay or ecclesiastic aristocrats of the Peloponnesos must have 
been, as an average, at least three times more important than the value of 
their contribution would indicate. Which would mean that the Peloponnesian 
prosopa must have been supported by paroikoi who numbered at least 15.000 
'zeugaratoi or the equivalent', may be considerably more. 
This means that in Xth century Peloponnesos, the total value of land 
possessed by the prosopa, and the total number of dependent peasants that 
worked for them, were at least five times larger than those of the 
Peloponnesian army53. It can also be considered as probable that the number 
of monks (say, ten per affluent monastery) was considerably higher than that 
of the soldiers -but no figures can be proposed in this respect because of the 
hypothetical and very fragile character of all our calculations54. 
There are some sectors of the population that remain completely out of 
the above picture: the farmers who owned their land but had nothing to do 
with the military, the free landowners; and the paroikoi who rented land 
from the fiscus, either as paroikoi of the demosion, or as paroikoi of imperial 
domains, such as the various episkepseis or kouratorciai. It is probable that 
the first group was more important than all the others but no closer estimates 
are possible. 
53. The dramatic increase of dependent peasantry is also reflected in the legislation. 
See Helga KÖPSTEIN, Zur Veränderung der Agrarverhältnisse in Byzanz vom 6. zum 10. 
Jh., in: Helga KÖPSTEIN (ed.), Besonderheiten der byzantinischen Feudalentwicklung, 
Berlin 1983, 69-76. 
54. J. Lefort has already pointed to the consideratile importance of monastic real 
estate in the Xth century: J. LEFORT, N. OIKONOMIDÈS, Denise PAPACHRYSSANTHCX , 
Actes d'Iviron I, Paris 1985, 31. 
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Thus we realize that in mid-Xth c. Peloponnesos, the dependent peas-
ants working on domains of local magnates were much more numerous than 
the free peasants who served in the army and those who supported them. The 
number of the paroikoi was certainly very important in Xth c. Peloponnesos. 
The system of small landownership was largely corroded, and it will be even 
more corroded in the late-Xth c, when, official complaints appear about the 
metropolis of Patras, which had taken over the properties of many soldiers 
and prejudiced all the region's penetes55. 
Comparison with the Thrakesion 
It is useful to compare the above calculations with what we know of the 
army of the Thrakesion in 949, at a date reasonably close to ours56. We have 
seen that the Thrakesion had then 800 stratiotai, out of whom 13.5% were 
indigent. There were another 150 officers and professional soldiers and 600 
Armenian soldiers guarding the coastline (the Armenians of Priene? or an 
imported contingent?). This makes a total army 1.550 strong, a figure quite 
close to the figure that we proposed for the Peloponnesos57. But this number 
breaks down quite differently, since only half of the Thrakesion was made up 
of soldier-farmers, the rest being filled up with professionals, members of a 
poor (or imported) minority. 
It is certain that the Thrakesion, with its several alluvial plains, was by 
tar more fertile than the hilly Peloponnesos. So one must reject right away 
the idea that this difference in the number of soldier farmers might be due to 
a difference in population or to a less efficient implantation of the institution 
of military holdings. On the contrary, one has every reason to believe that 
55. Epistolters byzantins du Xe siècle, ed. J. DARROUZÈS, Paris 1960, 102. 
56. De Cerìmoniis (Bonn), 666-667. 
57. The strength of the various Byzantine provincial armies that are mentioned here 
seem to me by far more reliable (because based on Byzantine technical texts) and also 
more realistic than those provided by the Arabic sources and taken at face value by W. 
TREADGOLD, Notes on the Numbers and Organization of the Ninth-Century By/antine 
Army, GreeA', Roman and Byzantine Studies 21, 1980, 269-288 and IDEM, The Army 
(above, note 8). 
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the Thrakesion was more populated than the Peloponnesos, and at least 
equally well organized. But we know that the Thrakesion, because of its 
fertility, was the region par excellence, where wealthy Constantinopolitans 
and wealthy Constantinopolitan and other instil niions had their properties. 
This being so, there is another explanation to be proposed for this 
discrepancy. The social evolution being more advanced in the Thrakesion 
than in the poorer Peloponnesos, the corrosion of the small landownership 
system was much more advanced. One third or half the soldier farmers of 
the Thrakesion had already been transformed into paroikoi and had to be 
replaced by mercenaries on a permanent basis in order to guarantee the 
security of the theme. And if this was so for the soldiers, one must assume 
that it was so for all small landowners. One has the impression that in the 
Thrakesion the paroikoi must have constituted the majority ot the population. 
Conclusion 
The texts of Constantine Porphyrogennetos provide us with snapshots of 
the social composition of two provinces at a time coinciding with the 
development of the imperial legislation meant to protect the small 
landowners from the greedy powerful. If the calculations contained in this 
paper are correct, one can say that in the Xth c. the free small landowners 
were on the way of becoming -if they had not already become- a minority in 
the Byzantine countryside. In other words, when the legislation to protect 
them started being issued, it was too late to legislate. One can understand 
better the concern of Romanos I in 934 about the need for "military 
contributions' and the gloomy comment ot Constantine VII (947?) about the 
'army being sick'58. The structure of the provincial society, including the 
military, had already irrevocably changed; the legislation was a desperate 
rearguard action. 
58. SVORONOS, Les novelles, 85 (n° 3), 118 (n° 5). 
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